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TITLE IX SEX DISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS:
PRIVATE COLLEGES AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
DAVID KROLL*
The publication of the Title IX sex discrimination regulations,'
aimed at the eradication of sex discrimination in education, has been
characterized as "an affirmation of the principles of equality upon
which our nation was founded." 2 This view is consistent with the hope
of those who had lobbied for the original legislation that the regulations
would "be far reaching . . . in mitigating the subtle and all-pervasive
effects of sex discrimination." ' 3 There are, however, those who have
maintained the regulations "would impose a strait jacket that would
deprive private education of the diversity and flexibility that it must
enjoy to make a successful contribution to American Higher Educa-
tion."' 4 This statement is symptomatic of a growing concern among
those associated with private colleges and universities. Their objection
is not with the ends to which the Title IX regulations are directed but
with the means chosen to achieve those ends. The fear is that the
increasing federal regulation of universities will destroy the qualities of
distinctiveness, diversity and pluralism engendered by the private
institution.5
* B.A., Ottawa University, 1975; J.D., Washington University, 1977.
1. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). The regulations were signed on May 27, 1975. Designed to
enforce Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. II
1972), they became effective July 21, 1975. For an account of the legislative debate, see
N.Y. Times, July 10, 1975, at 32, col. 4; id., July 15, 1975, at 38, col. 2.
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, June 3, 1975.
3. Hearings on House Concurrent Resolution 330 (Title IX Regulations) Before the
Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th
Cong., Ist. Sess. 54 (1975).
4. Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations Before the Subcomm. on Post-
Secondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 228 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations].
5. Some educators believe that federal legislation affecting educational institutions is
being enacted with insufficient consultation with the colleges and universities involved.
The legislation is seen as encroaching on their autonomy in a number of ways, including
the privacy requirements of the Buckley Amendment, Internal Revenue Service anti-
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This Note will analyze the competing legal interests of the federal
government in preventing discrimination and those of private colleges
and universities in preserving their autonomy. The balancing of these
principles in cases involving anti-bias legislation may to a great extent
determine the level of institutional compliance required unter Title IX.
I. THE BASIS OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation aimed at
eradicating class-based discrimination. A fundamental departure from
tradition, however, has been its effort to regulate private discrimina-
tion.6 To reach private activity, Congress has utilized its power to
regulate commerce among the states7 and the power to condition
federal contracts upon compliance with Federal legislation. 8
Pursuant to the commerce power, Congress enacted Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act9 which prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing,
compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment. 10 Prior
bias regulations and the hurried implementation of affirmative action programs. EDUC.
REC. Spring 1975, at 89.
Academic institutions are vulnerable because of the federal government's power to cut
off funds in order to enforce compliance with these laws. 121 CONG. REc. S3515 (daily
ed. March 10, 1975) (remarks of Kingman Brewster). Although the issue has become
more acute since 1972, the first implications of government involvement in education
were observed through the federal subsidies of research activity following the launching
of Sputnik in 1959. The issue involved the extent to which government funding of
research would tend to artificially determine which topics would be pursued. Kirk,
Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 607 (1963). For a
short history of federal aid to education, see K. ASHWORTH, SCHOLARS AND STATESMEN
14-21 (1972).
6. 117 CONG. REC. 8459-61 (1971) (statement of Congressman Carl Perkins).
7. U. S. CONST. art. 1, § 8: "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states." See, e.g., Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
8. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8: "The Congress shall have the Power to. . . pay the Debts
and provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States." See, e.g., Oklahoma v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) to 2000e-15 (1970).
10. Title VII applies to employers retaining at least fifteen employees for twenty
calendar weeks per year in an industry affecting commerce between states or in which a
labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce. Id. §§ 2000e (b), 2000e (h). Title VII
was amended in 1972 to reach state and local governments and the federal government.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e (b), 2000c (h) (1970)). The Title is enforced administratively through
Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (1976) (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission); 45 C.F.R. § 82 (1976) (Dept. of Health, Educ.
and Welfare). In Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 386 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1974) a
private college was held subject to Title VII and the commerce clause because it enjoyed
a national reputation and attracted sudents from throughout the United States.
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SEX DISCRIMINATION
to 1972, Title VII provided an exemption for religious associations and
all educational institutions," but in 1972 was extended to reach
academic employment.12
In accordance with the federal power to attach conditions to federal
contracts, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act13 and Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972 were enacted. 14 Title VI prohibits
any discrimination under federally assisted programs on the grounds of
race, color or national origin,15 and applies to schools receiving federal
assistance. Title IX in effect amended Title VI to include sex and was
designed to enforce equality in hiring, promotion, admissions, rules of
conduct, use of facilities, access to educational and athletic oppor-
tunities and a variety of additional academic endeavors. 16 The effect
was to apply detailed regulations substantially affecting internal gov-
ernance procedures to private, as well as public educational
institutions. 17.
II. THE EFFECTS ON DIVERSITY
It is not only the pervasiveness of the federal legislation that is
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-I (1970) (amended 1972).
12. Id. § 2000(e)-I (Supp. 11 1972).
13. Id. § 2000(d).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 11 1972).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970). Title VI is enforced pursuant to regulations at 45
C.F.R. § 80 (1973) (applicable to schools).
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. II 1972); 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). See Sandier, Sex
Discrimination, Educational Institutions, and the Law: A New Issue on Campus, J. L. &
EDUC. 613 (1973); Note, Implementing Title IX: The HEW Regulations, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 806 (1976); 49 TEMP. L.Q. 207 (1976). See also WEALABZUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS reprinted in 120 CONG. REC. E4863-69 (daily ed.
July 18, 1974).
Congress had been presented with evidence of widespread discrimination in educa-
tion. Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I & 2 (1970). The
Carnegie Council found that whereas the average salary for male faculty was $16,000 per
year in 1974-75, women were receiving $13,000, 82.5% of the male figure. The Council
also determined that women were hired predominantly in the lower faculty ranks, at the
level of instructor and assistant professor. Two-thirds of the academic departments
surveyed employed no women at the rank of professor. The situation is improving. Both
the percentage of females hired and their faculty rank have continued to improve
throughout the last ten years. One of the contributing factors to this rise in status was
federal legislation and its associated affirmative action programs. CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON
POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, MAKING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WORK IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 20-27, 48-54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE COUNCIL].
17. The Title IX regulations apply to over 16,000 public schools and 2,700 institutions
of higher education. Hicks, Women's Groups and Educators Urge Approval of Sex Bias
Rules, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, at 37, col. 1.
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alarming to private colleges and universities, but also the very critical
nature of the activity which is regulated.18 It has been suggested that
allowing the federal government, through Title IX, to determine the
internal governance of private colleges and universities will
homogenize and dilute the quality and diversity of American
education. 19
Among other functions, private colleges and universities serve to
maintain a market place of ideas in education, 20 restrain political influ-
ence in education by acting independently and providing a refuge for
the unpopular idea, 21 encourage academic innovation in the absence of
18. Yale University President Kingman Brewster describes the activities regulated as
"institutional diversity, autonomous trusteeship and faculty self-determination" which
are "the essence of the envied vitality of American higher education." 121 CONG. REC.
S3515, S3516 (daily ed. March 10, 1975) (remarks of Kingman Brewster). See also R.
LESTER, ANTIBIAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES, FACULTY PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLU-
TIONS(1974). The pervasiveness of regulation is exemplified by HEW's eight pages of
regulations written to enforce a statute only one paragraph long. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp.
III 1973), requiring affirmative action to end discrimination against the handicapped. 41
Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976). Universities are subject to regulations promulgated to enforce
legislation covering pensions, taxes, student aid, occupational health and safety, and
veteran's benefits; regulations to control discrimination issued by the Departments of
HEW, Labor and Agriculture; regulations protecting the rights of human subjects in
government financed research; and regulations guarding the privacy of student records.
HEW speculates that 40 sets of regulations will be written solely to enforce the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1976. Winkler, Proliferating Federal Regulation: Is Government
Now the Enemy?, Chronicle of Higher Education, Dec. 13, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
19. To a large extent the theory that the influence of government in education
destroys educational diversity has been borne out by empirical studies comparing both
large and small state colleges and universities with other types of institutions. State
schools ranked low on measures of liberal education, personal and social development,
critical thinking, knowledge, independence, human relations, individuality, faculty in-
teraction and campus involvement. C. PACE, THE DEMISE OF DIVERSITY? 108-111, 130-31
(1974). See generally G. ROCHE, THE BALANCING ACT-QUOTA HIRING IN HIGHER EDUCA-
tion (1974).
20. K. ASHWORTH, SCHOLARS AND STATESMEN-HIGHER EDUCATION AND GOVERNMENT
POLICY 13-16 (1972); Muller, The Purposes of the Independent Institution, EDUc. REC.
Summer 1975, at 145-48.
21. Many states vest in their lawmakers decisions as to tuition rates, campus loca-
tion, building design and placement, and space utilization standards. State auditors,
centralized purchasing facilities and civil service jurisdiction over non-academic em-
ployees also serve to influence educational policy. CARNEGIE COMM'N, THE CAPITOL AND
THE CAMPUS 101-102 (1971). In addition, legislators frequently attempt to oversee school
administrators and become involved in corrective measures, including the disciplining of
students and professors. H. EULAU & H. QUINLEY, STATE OFFICIALS AND HIGHER
EDUCATION 61-65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EULAU]. Some universities may be
protected from such political influence by state constitutions and state courts. See, e.g.
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871 (1973). See also
O'Neil, God and Government at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher
Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 525 (1975).
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bureaucratic strictures, 22 and help to socialize individuals from a vari-
ety of cultural, religious and educational groups into self-fulfilling
members of society.23 The need for government regulation of private
colleges and universities to eliminate discrimination must be balanced
against the potential impairment of these functions.24
A. The Effect of The Title IX Regulations
Colleges and universities are touched by Title IX in a variety of
ways. They will not be able to utilize any scholarships that lead to an
imbalance in funds for women studentsY Counseling texts, proce-
dures and tests must be evaluated to determine their sexual neutrality
while the school must assure that any disproportionate enrollment by
sex in a particular class is not a result of their counseling procedure. 26
It is thus more difficult for counseling programs to serve a selected
social or religious goal.
Private institutions also assert that the Title IX regulations will
prevent them from maintaining their educationally diverse character.
Many private colleges and universities maintain that rules pertaining to
conduct and morality are important parts of the educational environ-
ment.27 Yet the Title IX regulations prohibit the use of dress codes,
rules of conduct, domitory hours or other rules of morality which make
distinctions on the basis of sex. 28 Nor are institutions allowed to
discipline a female professor or a female student for being unmarried
22. EULAU, supra note 21, at 99-105; M. KEETON, MODELS AND MAVERICKS 51-52
(1971).
23. See generally W. GELLHORN & R. GREENAWALT, THE SECTARIAN COLLEGE AND
THE PUBLIC PURSE (1970).
24. See P. REINERT, To TURN THE TIDE 13-25 (1972); Muller, The Purposes of the
Independent Institution, EDUC. REc., Summer 1975, at 145-46.
25. 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(b) (1975). Universities may use scholarships restricted to a
particular sex so long as the overall effect is non-discriminatory.
26. Id. § 86.36(c).
27. Educators suggest the private institutions will henceforth be unable to establish
its own moral climate. Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 4, at 255.
Some courts have found appearance codes permissible. E.g., King v. Saddleback Junior
College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.
Ark. 1970). Most courts have not. E.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp.
529 (E.D. Tex. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Calbillo
v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Zachry v. Brown, 299
F. Supp. 1360 (N. D. Ala. 1967). Phyllis Schlafly, National Chairman, National Commit-
tee to Stop ERA, described the dress code regulations as "nonsense," and believes the
effect of the regulations is to force schools to introduce role reversals between men and
women. 121 CONG. REC. S12296 (daily ed. July 10, 1975).
28. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.31(b)(4), .31(b)(5), .32 (1975).
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and pregant or for undergoing an abortion. 29 Prohibiting such rules may
alter the nature of a student body and jeopardize both parental and
alumni support. °.
The high cost of compliance with anti-bias legislation will also have
an effect on an institution's allocation of financial resources.3 A two
year effort to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws cost the
University of California system more than four million dollars. 32 Other
estimates of compliance costs run from one percent to four percent of
a school's budget each year, a national total of two billion dollars in
1974. 33 Because this money could have been applied to institutionally
selected activities rather than those required by the federal govern-
ment, the university's autonomy was correspondingly undermined. 34
B. The Regulations and Faculty Selection
Most critical of all, however, is Title IX regulation of faculty hiring
and promotion. The regulations require that colleges and universities
evaluate their hiring, promotion and admission procedures to detect
any sexual bias and "take appropriate remedial steps to eliminate the
effects of any discrimination which resulted or may have resulted from
adherence to these policies or practices. 35 Should discrimination be
29. Id. §§ 86.21(c)(2), .21(c)(3), .40(b) (student), .57(b) (faculty).
30. Parents will frequently choose a college or university for their children precisely
because of its restrictive environment. Many students themselves will select a school for
these reasons. C. PACE. THE DEMISE OF DIVERSrrY? 51-105 (1974).
31. The University of Iowa, for example, has determined that the paperwork in-
volved in accepting funds under the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 1651-1697
(1970), requires an expenditure of $17 per veteran more than the government will allow
for administrative expenses. In 1974-75 Harvard University estimated that 60,000 hours
of faculty time were devoted to complying with federal regulations. Winkler, Proliferat-
ing Federal Regulations: Is Government Now "the Enemy"?, Chronicle of Higher
Education, Dec. 13, 1976, at 3, col I. See INTELLECT, Sept. 1975, at 76, col. 2 (describing
the compliance problems involved with I.R.S. regulations, Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B.
587, issued to prohibit institutional discrimation).
32. CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 169. Washington University, with an
enrollment of only 12,000, spent $250,000 for computer time in collecting information.
Memorandum from Peter H. Ruger, general counsel of Washington University, to
United States Dep't of Labor, Fall 1975, on file with the Urban Law Annual.
33. See Saunders, Association View of Federal Impact, EDuc. REC., Spring 1975, at
91. The paperwork demanded by the regulations is substantial. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §
86.3(d) (1975); 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.11, 60-2.25 (1971).
34. Walsh, Counting the Costs of Compliance, SCIENCE, Oct. 31, 1975, at 444-47. See
note 31 supra.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 86.3(c) (iii) (1975). One continuing source of friction between HEW,
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and colleges is that affirmative
action plans are applied to non-academic personnel, students, and faculty all in the same
manner. College and university administrators suggest that plans developed for indus-
[Vol. 13:107
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found to have existed at any time, the school must devise a plan to
correct any underrepresentation of women among its faculty. 36 Al-
though the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
denies it, an institution almost of necessity will have to apply some
special treatment in favor of women in order to achieve these goals. 37
The attempt to comply with affirmative action hiring goals may
present the most serious problem to private colleges. Within the
American college system, the faculty literally is the school. 38 The
faculty makes decisions on policy, curriculum, hiring and tenure of
professors and admissions of students. 39 Research-oriented univer-
trial situations cannot be applied to professional educators without causing a decrease in
faculty quality. It is all but impossible to develop objective standards by which to judge
the scholastic quality of a professor. In Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp 857
(D. Vt. 1976), a female professor's dimissal was held permissible upon the finding that
she could not adequately lecture in her Renaissance literature class upon John Donne
and Ben Johnson. In EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975),
dismissal was justified upon the department chairman's assessment of the quality of the
plaintiff's thesis. Professional criteria are difficult to codify and may be misleading if
codified in indicating that an objective test will be used to determine promotion when a
subjective decision on academic quality is in fact being made.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 86.3(a) (1975). Although courts may order certain affirmative action
plans to be implemented by schools as a remedy for past discrimination, e.g., United
States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
730 (1977), most academic affirmative action plans have been required by Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed.
Reg. 14,303 (1967). The Executive Order applies to contractors holding federal contracts
of $10,000 or more and employing at least 50 people, including colleges, prohibits
discrimination by each contractor, and requires that affirmative action be taken to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination. The extensive and costly requirements of an
affirmative action plan are indicated in Revised Order No. 4,41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1976). See
also, proposed regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 40,348 (1976); Chronicle of Higher Education,
Jan. 24, 1977 at 8, col 1.
37. In its Memorandum to College and University Presidents, 40 Fed. Reg. 2,459
(1975), HEW notes that it would be unacceptable for a school to advertise a position by
stating that "women and minorities are preferred" or "this is an affirmative action
position" because the affirmative action process should not restrict consideration to
women and minorities only. This seems inconsistent with some of the HEW-approved
affirmative action plans which set goals so specifically that they contemplate the hiring
of fractions of persons. CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 209. In June, 1975,
Washington University was told to develop an affirmative action plan whereby women
and minorities would be promoted at least at 80% of the rate non-minorities were
promoted. The University protested that because failure to comply with the numerical
ratio would result in a conclusive presumption of discrimination, it was no more than an
unfair quota. Memorandum from Peter H. Ruger, general counsel of Washington Un-
iversity, to United States Dep't of Labor, fall 1975, on file with the Urban Law Annual.
38. See Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv.
1045, 1048-49 (1968).
39. Although practices vary greatly, schools with high reputations tend to vest a
greater amount of authority in the tenured faculty than do community colleges. The
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sities typically give tenure to only a small group of faculty recognized
as experts in their respective fields. Recruitment is limited to the
handful of similar research institutions at which those experts present-
ly teach.' Institutions use a similar method for hiring untenured assist-
ant professors, relying not so much on reputation but upon confidential
recommendations and other subjective information. 41 Religious
schools and small liberal arts colleges also must rely on subjective
information in making faculty decisions and recruiting among some-
what limited sources to ensure the success of their particular
programs .
42
Affirmative action hiring may require colleges and universities to
expand their recruitment efforts to reach virtually the entire country. 43
If many universities attempt to hire additional female faculty mem-
larger research institutions put a great deal of weight on the decisions of the faculty in
each respective department. In making hiring decisions, the faculty search committee
must look at a candidate's academic qualifications and must also consider the candi-
date's particular qualifications in terms of the instructional objectives of the institution.
Achieving a diversity of faculty is generally a prime consideration in faculty selection. R.
LESTER, ANTIBIAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES, FACULTY PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLU-
tion 14-25 (1974); CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 56-62.
40. This method of selection has been referred to as the "old boy network" which
may indirectly serve to perpetuate racism and sexism in academic employment. White,
male faculty keep in contact with their white, male colleagues about people who are
performing well and are the most highly qualified in a particular field. See Goodwin, The
Great White Marshmallow, 1 WOMEN L. REP. 1.253 (1975).
41. Although some confidential material is used by a faculty search committee when
selecting an individual to fill a tenured position, it is not as critical at that level becasue of
the candidate's reputation and exposure. When hiring a new professor, however, the
faculty search committee will rely heavily upon confidential assessments solicited from
the candidate's supervising instructors at his graduate institution. R. LESTER, supra note
39, at 23.
42. For example, Fordham College has traditionally drawn heavily from the Jesuit
community. In the 1967-68 school term, 17 of 24 faculty members in the philosophy
department and 23 of 32 in the theology department were Jesuits. W. GELLHORN & R.
GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 98-99. Wheaton College, in attempting to establish an
environment consistent with "a citadel of Evangelical faith and fervor," requires that its
faculty sign a religious creed annually. M. KEETON, MODELS AND MAVERICKS 14-15
(1971).
43. Rather than rely upon traditional sources of faculty supply, federal regulations
require colleges and universities to actively advertise job openings among a variety of
new groups and associations. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.24(e) (1) (1971). Such recruiting, premised
as it is on largely physical characteristics, presents its own problems. Upon receiving a
letter from Swarthmore College stating, "Swarthmore College is looking for a black
economist," Professor Thomas Sowell of UCLA, a black, replied to the college that
"your approach tends to make the job unattractive to anyone who regards himself as a
scholar or a man. . . Swarthmore-quality faculty members are found through Swarth-
more-quality channels and not through mimeographed letters of this sort." G. ROCHE,
THE BALANCING ACT, QUOTA HIRING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 40-41 (1974).
[Vol. 13:107
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bers, the pool of well qualified candidates may quickly dry up. Exten-
sive reliance upon confidential recommendations may be precluded
because personnel records will be subject to inspection in discrimina-
tion suits and may therefore lack candor44 which would probably have
an immediate effect on hiring practices, subsequent effects on tenure
decisions, and might even lead to a deterioration of faculty quality and
distinctiveness .45
Many educators believe that the preservation of the attributes of
private education should be recognized as more than just social policy.
Yale president Kingman Brewster suggested an inherent constitutional
source of support when he noted that: "I'm not sure what constitution-
al grounds could be asserted to resist this leverage. But it does outrage
constitutional values.' '
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT OF EDUCATIONAL AUTONOMY
The freedom of private education has, in fact, been recognized and
afforded protection under a number of constitutional principles. The
three most significant sources of protection derive from the first
amendment free speech guarantees, 47 the state action requirement of
the fourteenth amendment, 48 and the separation of church and state
44. HEW regulations for proceedings under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970), or Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), make no
provision for maintaining the confidentiality of records, and such documents, as person-
nel records, may be subpoenaed. 41 C.F.R. § 81.63(K) (1967). Compare EEOC v.
University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974) (court required the school to
provide copies of faculty personnel records), with McKillip v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (court found that the personnel files of the art
department's faculty were privileged under state law as "official information" the
disclosure of which "is against the public interest"). For an example of the use of
confidential material in an academic discrimination dispute, see Rubenstein v. Universi-
ty of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976); Peters v. Middlebury
College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 860-64 (D. Vt. 1976).
45. Professor Lester describes a number of feared consequences including: (1) To the
extent affirmative action hiring deviates from standards of merit in selecting faculty, it
will cause other faculty to lose faith in the integrity of the promotion system; (2) a
two-status faculty would soon be established; faculty chosen because of their academic
potential faculty chosen because of their physical characteristics; (3) faculty discontent,
reduced faculty effectiveness and less drawing power for able students and faculty. R.
LESTER, supra note 39, at 81-82. But see Biehen, Ostriker & Ostriker, Sex Discrimi-
nation in the University: Faculty Problems and No Solution, 2 WOMEN'S RIoTrrs L. REP.
No. 3, at 3 (1975).
46. 121 CONG. REC. S3515 (daily ed. March 10, 1975) (remarks of Kingman Brewster).
47. The free speech guarantee has been described as a design for "safeguarding
academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
48. The fourteenth amendment has been used to implement a policy opposed to
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required by the first amendment's establishment clause. 49
These are not absolute rights, however, and may be held subject to
appropriate governmental regulation. To the extent that federal anti-
bias legislation attaches only to the economic aspects of the university
function, rather than attempting to directly regulate the exercise of
these constitutional rights, that legislation has been held constitutional-
ly permissible.50 But it is this deference to economically based infringe-
ments upon constitutional values which concerns many educators.5 '
A. Free Association and Academic Freedom
The Association of Independent Colleges and Universities has ar-
gued that recognition of a first amendment right in academic freedom
requires private institutions to be free from "the imposition of federal
direction, supervision or control over the. . . administration, or per-
sonnel of any educational institution.' '52 It is the remedial affirmative
action component of Title IX which relates most significantly to the
administrative and personnel practices of the regulated institution. The
goal hiring, data reporting and grievance resolution procedures of
affirmative action plans appear to be contrary to the theory of
academic freedom.
That theory, as established in Sweezy v. New Hampshire53 and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 54 denied the government authority to
require university professors to take loyalty oaths. Such a practice, it
was reasoned, interfered with the professor's academic freedom. That
freedom retains the character of free speech and is applicable where
judicial intervention in the control and "administration of discipline and the selection of
members of the faculty of universities and colleges". Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F.
Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
49. The establishment clause has been applied to preclude "active involvement of the
Sovereign in religious activity" including the educational activity of religious colleges.
Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
50. Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514
(4th Cir. 1975). Construing Title VI, the court found there is "no judicial support for the
proposition that the First Amendment protection for the free exercise of religion is any
more inviolable ... than the First Amendment's secular protection of freedom of
association which results in similar privately sponsored racial exclusion." Id. at 607.
51. "My fear is that there is a growing tendency for the central government to use the
spending power to prescribe educational policies. These are matters which they could
not regulate if it were not for our dependence on their largesse." 121 CONG. REC. 53516
(daily ed. March 10, 1975) (remarks of Kingman Brewster).
52. Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 4, at 235.
53. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
54. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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the government seeks to restrict professional access to the class-
room.5 The government has no more authority in those situations that
it does to restrain free speech generally. 56 Academic freedom is "a
special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 57
The institution itself may be able to assert the right of academic
freedom pursuant to a parallel right of free association.58 Cases dealing
with the right of free association have held that governmental regula-
tion is impermissible when it subjects members of a group "to
economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion,
and other manifestations of public hostility" 59 adversely affecting the
group's ability to foster its beliefs. Additionally, in Buckley v. Valeo, 60
the Supreme Court held that a campaign finance law could not restrict
individual economic decisions in respect to campaign donations be-
cause it was the expenditures themselves which were the speech pro-
tected by the first amendment.6' Similarly, it is the selection of faculty
by colleges and universities which is the substance of associational
freedom and it is precisely this selection of faculty which Title IX
55. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968); Whitehill v. Elkins, 389
U.S. 54, 62 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956). But
see Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129 (1959); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ.,
357 U.S. 399, 408 (1958); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 494 (1952).
56. See Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 447, 464-65 (1963); Note, Developments in The Law-Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1968); Note, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional
Context, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 600 (1968).
57. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
58. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), Arkansas attempted to require all
public school teachers to disclose their membership in various organizations. Aimed at
disciplining members of the NAACP, the court struck the scheme down as an infringe-
ment of the right of free association. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the
NAACP itself asserted the right. The state sought to require the NAACP to disclose the
names of its members along with financial data. The court, however, held that the intent
of the legislation was to subject the members to-public intimidation and as such was an
impermissible impingement on their right of association.
59. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958). See also Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (college must recognize right of student groups to organize,
under reasonable conditions); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971)(right extends to the ability of union members to assist each other in asserting rights).
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. The Congressional legislation sought to limit individual campaign contributions to
$1000 per candidate, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (1975), and $25,000 for all candidates com-
bined, id. § 608(b)(3). The court, however, reasoned that the reality of contemporary
political expression through the mass media required that an individual, to most effec-
tively express his views, must be allowed to exercise his right of speech through
monetary expenditures.
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seeks to regulate. 62 To the degree that Title IX dictates faculty selec-
tion processes through affirmative action or remedial employment
practices, it is arguably an impermissible restriction on the rights of
free association. The Buckley analysis supports a finding that the
relationship of speech to employment is so close that to allow a
distinction between its economic and speech elements would frustrate
first amendment rights.63
In closely analogous situations, however, this conflict between anti-
bias regulation and associational freedom has been consistently re-
solved in favor of government regulation. One theory for reaching this
result was. applied by the Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary.'
Private academies had denied admission to plaintiff's child solely on
the basis of the child's race. 65 Plaintiff sought injunctive and compen-
satory relief pursuant to a federal statute. 66 Aimed at an economic
relationship, the legislation guaranteed blacks the same right to con-
tract "enjoyed by white citizens." 67 The Court characterized the
62. "It prohibits recipients from granting preferences to employment applicants who
are graduates of particular institutions. . . .[The school] shall take remedial action to
recruit members of the sex discriminated against until the effect of such past discrimina-
tion no longer exists." Statement of HEW, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,146 (1975).
63. Buckley distinguished two previous cases which found government regulation of
private conduct permissible when the government was acting from economic motives.
Civil Ser. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), upheld Hatch Act restric-
tions on the political activities of federal employees as a valid means of controlling
patronage and promoting merit and efficiency in government service. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), legislation prohibiting the burning of draft cards approved
because it served administrative convenience with respect to the Congressional duty to
raise armies. Buckley narrowed Letter Carriers application to situations in which the
conduct regulated did not threaten expression but only the time and place of its delivery.
424 U.S. at 48 & n.54. O'Brien was distinguished because in that case the government
had not intended to regulate expression. In Buckley, however, Congress sought to limit
contributions and that was the protected expression. Id. at 65 & n.76. But see Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 563 & n. 10 (1977)
(the Court implicitly suggested that O'Brien would be limited to situations in which the
legislature acted with the purpose of impinging rights of free speech. Any legislation
which inadvertently impinged upon those rights would not violate the first amendment).
64. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
65. These academies developed as a result of the integration of southern school
districts between 1965 and 1970. In the 1963-64 school year only 17 such schools existed
with an enrollment of 2,362. By 1970, 155 had been established, enrolling 42,000 white
students. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). This section was enacted pursuant to U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude. . . shall exist within the
United States."
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 was first recognized as applying to private
conduct when its counterpart, § 1982, was held to prohibit private acts of discrimination
in the field of housing. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968). Section
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school-student relationship as contractual and therefore enjoined the
schools from discriminating in their policy of admission.'
When confronted with the argument that the white parents pos-
sessed a right of free association allowing them to send their children
to schools emphasizing the value of racial segregation, the Court
distinguished between the speech and the conduct element of free
association. The Court acknowledged that Congress could not abridge
the right of the school to promote a belief in racial segregation, but
could, nonetheless, regulate the practice of segregation. 69 Thus, the
faculty may instruct pupils in the values of racial separation, but they
must address those ideas to an integrated classroom. The Court
reasoned there was no inconsistency involved since "there is no show-
ing that discontinuance of the discriminatory admissions practices
would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of any ideas or
dogma." '70 McCrary suggests that private discrimination can be pro-
tected under the first amendment as an expression of belief. This
protection, however, requires only that the discrimination be tolerated;
it is not to be accorded affirmative constitutional protection.71 Legisla-
tion enacted consistent with any explicitly expressed constitutional
policy, therefore, is to be given priority over any discriminatory prac-
tices inherent in the exercise of free association. 72
A second theory permitting government regulation of associational
freedom relies not on a speech-conduct dichotomy but upon a balanc-
1981 has only been applied to cases of racial discrimination, not sex discrimination.
Johnson v. Railroad Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). Some commentators
have suggested, however, that § 1981 should also apply to sexual classification because
the thirteenth amendment applies to all U.S. citizens. See Stanley, Sex Discrimination
and Section 1981, 1 WOMEN'S RIGHTs L. REP., No. 4, at 2 (1973).
68. The successful attorney for plaintiffs in McCrary, George S. Leonard, suggests
that the effect of this decision may actually aid the academies. He believes there are no
blacks willing to attend these schools, yet the fact that the schools cannot now discrimi-
nate may restore previously denied tax exemptions. Landau, Decision on Integration
Ineffective, Kansas City Star, July 23, 1976, at 38, col. 5. It may not be that easy. I.R.S.
regulations require more than just subjective non-discrimination. Discrimination in the
selection of faculty is a prima facie case for showing discrimination in admissions. Rev.
Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
69. 427 U.S. at 176.
70. Id.
71. Id., citing Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973) (state's loan of
textbooks to such schools constituted impermissible affirmative support).
72. Such policy includes that expressed in the fourteenth amendment, Green v.
Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Coit v. Green,
400 U.S. 986 (1971); the thirteenth amendment, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976); and the fifteenth amendment, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
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ing of interest test. 73 This theory recognizes academic freedom as a
defense to government sanctions when the regulatory scheme attempts
to require the beliefs and ideas of instructors to conform to state
conceptions of propriety. The government may, however, develop a
narrower statutory scheme proscribing only that speech which pre-
sents a clear and present danger to the public.' The government then
possesses a legitimate interest in the proscription of speech which
outweighs the countervailing guarantee of academic freedom. In the
context of anti-bias regulation the government's interest in eliminating
discrimination is similar to its interest in protecting the public from
clearly dangerous speech.
In Green v. Connally,75 under facts similar to McCrary, the parents'
right of free association for their children was found insufficient to
allow private schools an exemption from Title VI sanctions.76 Green
held that the government could regulate the education of children in
the interest of the public welfare, based on the fourteenth amend-
ment's policy of protection of the individual from class-based discrimi-
nation. 77 In light of that interest the federal government could with-
draw economic benefits from a school shown to discriminate in its
admissions.
Both McCrary and Green dealt with the admission of students rather
than the selection of faculty. That distinction may be critical, as
McCrary found that the admission of certain students may not inhibit
the teaching of particular ideas. 78 That element could be absent in a
challenge to a Title IX faculty affirmative action program. 79
73. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) establishes the test usually
applied when balancing free expression against governmental interest. The government's
regulation is justified when (I) it is within the consitutional power of the government; (2)
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on first amend-
ment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
74. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
75. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
76. The government assistance involved in Green was a tax exemption provided to
educational institutions. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501. See also Horvitz, Tax Subsidies to Promote
Affirmative Action in Admission Procedures for Institutions of Higher Learning-Their
Inherent Danager, 52 TAxEs 452 (1974).
77. 330 F. Supp. at 1167. "There is a compelling as well as a reasonable government
interest in the interdiction of racial discrimination. . . . That government interest is
dominant over other constitutional interests .. "
78. 427 U.S. at 176; see text at note 70 supra.
79. Compare McCrary (students) with Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229,
1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (faculty).
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Green indicates that a claim of academic freedom may succeed
where legislation seeks to proscribe activity which is discriminatory
solely in its effect.' While Titles VI and VII may be violated by a
practice discriminatory in effect, the fourteenth amendment prohibits
only conduct which purposely discriminates. 8' An affirmative action
program, required to remedy the past effects of discrimination and not
mandated by finding of present discrimination, 82 would thus not be
required by the fourteenth amendment. It would instead be a statutory
remedy. That remedy, however, by looking to objective effects rather
than subjective intent, would shift the burden of proof from the gov-
ernment to those asserting the right of free association. The Green
rationale might then be used to find an impermissable infringement of
academic freedom.
Although a defense of free association in faculty selection has never
80. 330 F. Supp. at 1166-67. Green reasoned implicitly that an academic freedom
argument may succeed where the legislative scheme did not provide that the government
would assume the burden of proof in establishing that the defendant school was subjec-
tively engaging in discrimination. The Green court discussed Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958), in which the state was not allowed to attach to a tax exemption a
provision that the taxpayer not advocate the overthrow of the government by unlawful
means because such a provision might include both protected and unprotected speech.
The Green court noted that the defendant school did not deny discriminating on the basis
of race. Thus, Speiser was not applicable. The Green court did find that "[i]f schools
sincerely terminate those harmful activities they may obtain the exemption." 330 F.
Supp. at 1166 (emphasis added).
81. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court held that a police depart-
ment qualifying test, designed to further police efficiency rather than to implement a
discriminatory intent, was not invalid if it produced a discriminatory effect. In accord
with Washington, the California Supreme Court found subjective discrimination would
have to be established before preference could be given minorities. Bakke v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 2d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
730 (1977). The fact that minorities are underrepresented "would not suffice to support a
determination that the University has discriminated against minorities in the past." Id. at
59, 553 P.2d at 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
82. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555
(1977), the Court established a variety of methods by which subjective intent may be
shown. They include (I) stark evidence the official action bears more heavily on one
group than another; (2) evidence that there is a past series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes; (3) evidence of the specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision; (4) evidence of departures from the normal procedural sequence;
and (5) evidence of an administrative history, statements by members of the decision-
making body and minutes of its meetings or reports indicating a discriminatory intent.
Id. at 564-65. The Court placed a further qualification upon a finding of discriminatory
intent in dicta, stating that even if there is a finding of discriminatory purpose the court
must also determine whether that purpose was the cause in fact of the harm to plaintiff.
Id. at 567 & n.26. For an application of these tests in an academic employment context,
see EEOC v. Tufts Inst., 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975); Peters v. Middlebury
College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
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been raised explicitly in the context of academic anti-bias regulation, 3
the legitimacy of the defense may be implicitly recognized in the
implementation of affirmative action plans. Responding to similar pol-
icy arguments courts have accorded schools a broad professional ex-
emption in respect to remedies for discrimination in faculty selection
and have subjected remedial hiring plans to particularly stringent
standards.
Title VII analysis provides that a plaintiff need not show purposeful
class bias to establish a charge of discrimination. It normally will be
enough to show statistically that a hiring practice, although neutral on
its face, nonetheless results in a discriminatory effectY4 Having shown
such discrimination, the burden of proof is shifted to the employer to
either rebut the inference of discrimination or to demonstrate the
necessity of the discriminatory effect.85
In a number of academic discrimination cases, however, an other-
wise adequate showing that plaintiff's discharge resulted in a statisti-
cally verified pattern of discrimination was held insufficient to justify
judicial interference into the faculty selection process.8 6 While this
83. In Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 607 (D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975), the court asserted in dicta that freedom of association was no
defense to a valid civil rights action. This argument was based on reasoning from the
opinion in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green
404 U.S. 997 (1971). There the court found that since the fourteenth amendment was
ratified subsequent to the Bill of Rights, it was "dominant over other constitutional
interests to the extent that there is complete and unavoidable conflict." Id. at 1167. In
New York Inst. of Tech. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 40 N.Y.2d 316, 353 N.E.2d 598,
386 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1976), however, the court relied upon the right to academic freedom
and held that an administrative agency did not have the capacity under a state civil rights
law to order tenure be given to a professor. Despite the state's "strong and important"
public policy against discrimination, the remedy was declared erroneous as a matter of
law. "Only under the gravest of circumstances, where all other conceivable remedies
have proved ineffective or futile should the comissioner enter the campus to impose the
conferring of tenure." Id. at 321, 353 N.E.2d at 603-04, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
84. United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 730 (1977); Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 509 F.2d 48 (8th
Cir. 1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
See generally A. LARSON, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.30 (1975); Dorsaneo,
Statistical Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975).
85. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). See generally
Comment, Title VII: Discriminatory Results and the Scope of Business Necessity, 35 LA.
L. REV. 146 (1974); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: A No Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
86. Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Tufts
Inst., 421 F. Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1975); Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857
(D. Vt. 1976); Labat v. Board of Higher Educ., 401 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Green v. Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 594 (5th
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perhaps would be sufficient in an industrial employment case,8 7 col-
leges have been permitted to justify the dismissal of a minority profes-
sor upon such highly subjective grounds as "teaching ability," "publi-
cations and scholarly activity" and "service to the community. ' 88
Schools need only demonstrate that faculty selection criteria are
reasonable, bear a rational relationship to the duties of a college
instructor, and that "the dominant considerations in the decisions not
to grant the plaintiff a contract are professional. '8
9
The extent of judicial reluctance to interfere in the faculty selection
decision is graphically illustrated by Pace College v. Commission on
Human Rights90 and Labat v. Board of Higher Education.91 In Pace,
the plaintiff produced statistics showing that only seventeen percent of
the school's female faculty was tenured, in contrast to seventy-three
percent of the male faculty.92 It was shown in Labat that seventy-two
percent of the white faculty at Queen's College was tenured, but only
fifty-five percent of the black faculty had obtained this distinction. 93
Both courts held, nonetheless, that in the absence of a showing that the
schools had specifically taken their class membership ibto considera-
tion in denying tenure, plaintiffs could not obtain judicial relief. 94
Cir. 1973); Pace College v. Commission on Human Rights, 38 N.Y.3d 28, 339 N.E.2d
880, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975). But see Wagner v. Long Island Univ., 419 F. Supp 618
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Dyson v. Lavery, 417 F. Supp. 103, 112-13 (E.D. Va. 1976).
87. Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers
Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). See also 41
C.F.R. § 60-5.21 (1970) (Washington Plan); id. § 60-6.21 (1971) (San Francisco Plan).
88. Green v. Board of Regents, 335 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 474
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973).
89. Peters v. Middlebury College, 409 F. Supp. 857, 868 (D. Vt. 1976); accord,
Franklin v. Atkins, 409 F. Supp. 439, 452 (D. Colo. 1976); Chung-Lin Yu v. Criser, 330
So.2d 198 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976): New York Inst. of Tech. v. State Div. of Human Rights,
40 N.Y.2d 316, 353 N.E.2d 598, 386 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1976); Maloff v. Commission on
Human Rights, 38 N.Y.2d 334, 342 N.E.2d 563, 379 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1975); Board of
Higher Educ. v. Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 199 N.E.2d 141, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964). See
also Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1976); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
90. 38 N.Y.2d 753, 342 N.E.2d 566, 377 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
91. 401 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
92. 38 N.Y.2d at 31, 339 N.E.2d at 884, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 477. Plaintiff brought an
action both for an individual remedy and a class action. For the strategy behind this type
of action, see B. Phillips, Discovery, Evidence and Trial Techniques-The Plaintiff
Position, in HANDLING THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE 82 (G. Holmes & Q.
Story ed. 1975).
93. 401 F. Supp. at 757.
94. In Pace the court found the statistics presented by plaintiff unpersuasive and so
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"Neither the commission nor the courts should invade, and only rarely
''95assume academic oversight, ... in such sensitive areas ....
Recognizing this privilege in the context of academic discrimination
solves the problem of free association presented by both McCrary and
Green. Pace and Labat indicate that courts will emphasized neutral
procedures rather than the federal agencies' emphasis on neutral ef-
fect. By rejecting as irrelevent the issue of discriminatory effect, Pace
defers to professional judgment the decision as to what constitutes
proper faculty qualifications. This deference restrains any tendency by
the court to prescribe the nature of proper scholastic criteria, thus
avoiding interference with academic expression that seems to have
concerned the McCrary court.
Green also suggested that colleges and universities must be given an
opportunity to establish that they were not purposely engaged in dis-
crimination. Private schools might otherwise be penalized for innocent
conduct thereby frustrating their associational freedom. Pace solved
this same problem by providing an opportunity for the university to
establish a rational relationship between the alleged discriminatory
criteria and the duties of a college instructor. Such a showing estab-
lishes that there was no intent to discriminate but rather a permissible
attempt to determine bona fide academic qualifications.
Perhaps the most difficult problem the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) faces in enforcing affirmative action plans
stems from the increasing tendency among courts to invalidate plans
they believe cause reverse discrimination. 96 The difficulty with some
plans is that they must go beyond assuring sexual neutrality and actual-
ly require preferential treatment to achieve the desired results. Exam-
ples of such treatment include expanding recruitment efforts to
denied her class action claim. The court did, however, grant relief to plaintiff in her
action as an individual. The court found subjective discrimination as to her, relying on
evidence that her superior found her a "trouble-maker," that he felt he could not use
four letter words in her presence, and that he discharged her for appealing her denial of
tenure. 38 N.Y.2d at 34-35, 339 N.E.2d at 882-83, 377 N.Y.S. 2d at 474-75.
95. Id. at 38, 339 N.E.2d at 885, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
96. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976); Board of Regents v.
Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975); Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417
F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 18 Cal. 3d 34,553 P.2d
1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 730 (1977); Alevey v. Downstate Medical
Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537,384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976). But see Stewart v. New
York Univ., 44 U.S.L.W. 2481 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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uniquely sexually or racially oriented sources, 97 maintaining data on all
hiring, firing and promotions along class lines, 98 and compliance with
very specific hiring goals and timetables. Although HEW maintains
that these goals are not quotas but flexible guidelines, 99 the distinction
in many cases may be hard to draw. In the University of California-
Berkeley plan for instance, a hiring goal as precise as 3.9 additional
female faculty was set for the school's history department.
The resemblance of some goals to quotas was not overlooked by the
court in Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth University. 10 In Cramer
the university sought to comply with its affirmative action plan by
setting aside all requests for faculty appointments from white males
and considered instead only those applicants that were female.'10 The
court found that although the federal guidelines had been correctly
interpreted by the university, the regulations themselves violated the
equal protection clause by giving paramount consideration to sex pref-
erences, quotas or goals. 0 2 By disapproving the affirmative action
plan, the court not only checked government intervention, but also
dictated the use of reasonable standards in faculty selection. The
university was obligated to consider "equally qualified candidates for
competitive positions."' 13 Similarly, it was held in Flanagan v. Presi-
97. See 40 Fed. Reg. 2,459 (1975) (Guidelines for Colleges and Universities). 41
C.F.R. § 60-2.24(e) (1971).
98. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (1971); note 36 supra.
99. 40 Fed. Reg. 37,064 (1975); id. 2,460. See Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542,
551-52 (D. Md. 1976).
100. 415 F. Supp 673 (E.D. Va. 1976).
101. Apparently the tenured faculty members involved in making employment deci-
sions were told the university would be required to increase its ratio of female faculty.
The selection committee first selected all applicants who appeared to be qualified, then
put aside all white males and eventually selected three women. Id. at 676.
102. The federal regulation at issue was Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 164 (1974).
The court also found the order contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2() (1970). That section provides
that no employer is required to grant preferential treatment to any individual because "of
an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin". 415 F. Supp. at 678. See Note Title
VII and Preferential Treatment: The Compliance Dilemma, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 671,
684-99 (1976); 11 Urban L. Ann. 333, 334-36 (1976).
103. 415 F. Supp. at 677 (emphasis added). The court, citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974), reasoned that since sex was not a suspect classification, the govern-
ment, through Title VII, could make a classification by sex if there was merely a rational
basis for the distinction. The court in Cramer could find no reason whatsoever for
making the classification. "The court can conceive of no rational relationship between
gender and suitability for being hired. . . as an instructor." 415 F. Supp. at 677-78. The
implication that sex cannot be a rational qualification for selection as an instructor may
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dent of Georgetown College'°4 that an affirmative action plan giving
special consideration to race in financial aid applications was an imper-
missible form of reverse discrimination. The case illustrates a judicial
preference for decisions based on merit, decisions by admissions com-
mittees based on the applicant's academic potential, rather than the
dictates of anti-bias regulation. 5
To the extent that courts accept a rationale similar to that applied in
Cramer and Flanagan, the scope of affirmative action plans may be
severely restricted. 106 The Cramer opinion seems to allow HEW to
achieve Title IX compliance only through requirements that university
procedures be non-discriminatory and free from inherent bias. Flana-
gan might provide more leeway by allowing that "separate treatment
prevent the government from requiring colleges and universities to consider sex in place
of other, more rational, criteria. By allowing the school to determine who is qualified
upon any basis other than subjective class discrimination, the court granted the school
the same deference as did the Pace College court.
104. 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976). The court found that "where an administrative
procedure is permeated with social and cultural factors .. . separate treatment for
'minorities' may be justified." Id. at 384.
105. Id. The college asserted that its affirmative action program was required by
regulations written to enforce Title VI, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b) (6) (1975). The court,
however, felt that even though the school had discretion to apply a variety of social and
cultural factors in selecting students for admission, it was a violation of the Title VI
non-discrimination clause to use a racial distinction in allocating aid funds. Once a
student had shown financial need it could not be said that a minority student's lack of
money was any more severe than any other student's. While a school could use compen-
sating social factors in order that all students could be realistically judged on the "same
basis" (e.g., merits in the admissions process), racial distinctions could only serve to
provide an irrational advantage to one race over another where a "scarce resource" was
involved (e.g., jobs, financial aid).
106. The Cramer court held that a congressionally imposed affirmative action pro-
gram requiring distinctions, based upon sex violated the equal protection clause. See
note 103 supra. The Flanagan court held that such a plan was a violation of Title VI and,
by implication, of the parallel language in Title IX. See note 105 supra.
In both Rosenstock v. Board of Governors, Civ. 75-483 D (M.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 1976),
and Timmerman v. University of Toledo, 421 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ohio 1976), the courts
adopted a reasoning similar to Flanagan. In Rosenstock the court held that a university
could adopt an admissions policy giving special preference to minorities. Since the effect
in that situation would have been to promote racial equality rather than inequality the
state school needed to show only a rational basis for its distinction. That rational basis
was established by the state's interest in educating its citizens. In Timmerman, the
university was found to be exercising permissible discretion when it placed less emphasis
upon the LSAT scores and grade-point averages of minority applicants than it did for
other students. "A law school is not bound by any . . . mechanical criteria which are
insensitive to the potential of such an applicant which may be realized in a more
hospitable environment." 421 F. Supp. at 466. But see Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ.,
420 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553
P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 730 (1977).
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for 'minorities' may be justified in order to ensure that all persons are
judged in a racially neutral fashion." 107 Both cases, however, hold that
subjective bias, even if compensatory, is an impermissable departure
from professional standards of merit.
HEW has encountered significant public opposition in its attempts to
require universities to comply with affirmative action programs. HEW
has had to back down from a compliance ultimatum in the face of an
adverse public reaction and was upbraided in the press for its "reflex-
ive, oppressive and unproductive way" of regulating academic
discrimination. 10
B. The State Action Requirement
A second constitutional principle that may reinforce the claim of
autonomy of private education derives from the fourteenth amend-
ment. 109 That amendment requires only that governmental activity
107. 417 F. Supp. at 377.
108. Statement of Chancellor Edwin Young in Revolt of the Chancellors, Washington
Post, at A-14, col. 1. HEW has experienced a number of compliance problems. Because
of understaffing and inexperience, a rather large backlog of cases has built up. By
December, 1973, only 18 of 201 affirmative action plans submitted had been officially
approved and 169 were still to be acted upon. Furthermore, of 358 individual complaints
submitted to HEW under Executive Order 11246, 159 had not been resolved by the end
of fiscal year 1975. CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 16, at 155-57. In an attempt to
alleviate the backlog, HEW proposed in June, 1975, to cease investigating individual
complaints and concentrate instead on patterns of discrimination. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,136
(1975). Reaction to the proposal, however, was so "overwhelmingly negative" that it
was dropped nine months later. Hicks, H.E.W. Drops Curb on Bias Inquires, N.Y.
Times, March 17, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
On February 17, 1977, Secretary of HEW Joseph Califano announced that HEW
would begin to accelerate enforcement of Title IX. The Secretary ordered a list compiled
of colleges and school systems that have assured HEW they are complying with the Title
IX regulations. Those who do not comply within 60 days after March 15 "will face the
initiation of legal proceedings leading to termination of federal funds." Hicks, H.E. W.
Warning of Funds Cutoff, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1977, at A-16, col.l.
109. "No state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws". U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A similar prohibition applicable to the federal
government is derived from the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954). Purely private conduct is left free from due process requirements. 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970), however, may be an exception. Although passed to implement
the fourteenth amendment, it reaches private conduct when there has been a private
conspiracy to deprive an individual of his rights under the law. Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974), §
1985 was held adequate grounds for an employment sex discrimination remedy even
though no state action was found. But see Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818(7th Cir. 1975) (state action applies to § 1985 to the extent that a state guaranteed right is
frustrated).
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meet standards of due process and equal protection. The exemption of
private education from the due process and equal protection require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment is the result of its classification as
private conduct. 10 The freedom of conduct allowed private colleges
and universities releases them from the requirement of maintaining
procedures for validating the fairness of all hiring, discharge and
admissions decisions.' They will be allowed to discriminate on the
basis of religious affiliation and social, political, or intellectual beliefs.
Most crucial of all is the extent to which they are freed of legislative
and judicial interference. The policy behind this public-private
dichotomy relates to "the very possibility of doing something different
than government can do, of creating an institution free to make choices
government cannot. ' " 2
It is not accurate to say that due process standards apply only to
state and federal government, however, for the government will not be
allowed to accomplish indirectly through aid to a private institution
what it is constitutionally prohibited from doing directly. "' Courts are
often faced with the dilemma of determining when the connection
between a private institution and the government is so close that the
institution's conduct will be attributed to the government and held to
due process standards. The distinction between public and private
activity is usually preserved through a requirement that before due
process rights will be enforced against a school, there must be a finding
that the conduct involved is directly connected to the government's
assistance1 4 or is serving a public function the government would
110. See Faccenda & Ross, Constitutional and Statutory Regulation of Private Col-
leges and Universities, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 539, 543-48 (1975); Gallagher, Desegregation:
The Effect of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment on Single-Sex Colleges, 18 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 41 (1973); Note, Private Universities: The Right to be Different, 11 TULSA
L.J. 58 (1975). See also Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819) (the state was not allowed to remake the college into a public entity). Justice
Marshall found the relationship between the state and the private trustees one protected
by the constitution's prohibition on state interference with the right to contract. Id. at
627-29, 637-39.
111. Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (not court's
function to regrade student's exams); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609
(D.D.C. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (disciplining of
faculty). See pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (fourteenth amendment
prevents state from prohibiting private schools to exist); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (fourteenth amendment prohibits state from restricting school's ability to
teach German).
112. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PENUMBRA 30 (1969).
113. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961).
114. Cases in which the government was found not to be directly involved in the
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otherwise undertake. 1 5 In addition, policy considerations may be im-
plicitly weighed. The state action determination seeks to balance "the
offensiveness of the conduct, and the value of preserving a private
sector free from the constitutional requirements applicable to govern-
ment institutions."11 6
challenged conduct include Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975);
(university used state name and financial aid); Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d
Cir. 1975) (government aid and contracts); Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1974) (government research contract); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d
1137 (2d Cir. 1973) (school on site acquired at public sale); Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443
F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) (state granted charter); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d
1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (state required college to publically file plan for student discipline);
Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.
1968) (shared campus with state college); Winsey v. Pace College, 394 F. Supp. 1324
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (state aid); Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa.
1974) (state charter and aid); Furumoto v. Lyman, 362 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
(state gave tax exemptions and power to change tution; Brownley v. Gettysburg College,
338 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (government scholarship assistance); McLeod v.
College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970) (government aid); Torres v. Puerto
Rico Junior College, 298 F. Supp. 458 (D.P.R. 1969) (federal loans and aid); Grossner v.
Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (state and federal aid).
But see Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965); Braden v.
University of Pittsburgh, 392 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (lower tution for in state
students; state named some trustees); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (federal aid and tax exemptions); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152
(D. Mass. 1973) (athletic conference dominated by state colleges and universities).
115. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ.,
336 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc.2d 651, 324 N.Y.S.2d
964 (1971).
116. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1974). Compare Grafton v.
Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1973) (inappropriate for courts to interfere
with the student grading process), with Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir.
1975) (discrimination charges susceptible to a judicial remedy).
The implicit use of this policy oriented test may help explain the results of otherwise
inconsistent cases. In Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973), for
instance, Boston University was held to due process standards when the school declared
varsity hockey players ineligible pursuant to an NCAA rule. The opinion reasoned that
since 85% of the NCAA membership consisted of state institutions, the university's
conduct was mandated by a governmental rule, the NCAA regulation. Furthermore,
although the court noted that state aid to Boston University totaled only $55,000 annual-
ly, the university was found to be fulfilling a public function as if it were a state agency.
In contrast, however, Columbia University has been held not to be operating as a public
entity, although almost 50% of its income in 1967 was obtained from the federal
government. Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Similarly, the government was found not to be a direct participant in New York
University's dismissal of an instructor despite the fact that he was working on a project
funded by and for the benefit of the federal government. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974). The distinction between Grossner, Wahba and Buckton is
principally that Columbia and New York University were performing traditional
academic functions (student discipline and faculty dismissal) while Boston University
was merely conducting a sports program of minimal relevance to its education goals.
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Although perhaps not intended by Congress, Title IX may have
assumed a similar, judicially bestowed, state action requirement. Title
IX, in language modeled after Title VI, provides that no person "on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... -117 The decision
as to what constitutes a "benefit" and when a particular department or
program is receiving federal "assistance" presents issues similar to
those involved in the state action analysis.
In McGlotten v. Connally"8 the court determined that before the
Department of the Treasury could terminate certain tax exemptions
afforded the Elks Club, it would have to be established that the
exemptions actually constituted federal support of the Club's racially
discriminatory membership policy in contravention of Title VI. H9 The
court decided that some of the exemptions indicated governmental
support of the Club's policies and amounted to federal benefits for
purposes of Title VI.120 A deduction for funds generated only from
club members, however, was characterized as a mere failure of the
government to tax and could not be classified as federal assistance of
discrimination.' 21 In holding that "assistance" required affirmative
government support and not just a failure to act, Title VI acquired a
state action component similar to that of the fourteenth amendment.
The advantages of such a state action theory to private colleges and
universities are illustrated by Stewart v. New York University.22 The
Stewart court found that despite the presence of federally derived
student loans, grants, tax advantages, and other financing there was an
insufficient connection between the assistance and the school's alleged
discriminatory admissions policy to warrant application of a Title IX
117. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 11 1972).
118. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
119. The Elks Club does not allow blacks to become members. Although plaintiff did
not seek standing due to any injury he suffered from being denied Elks membership
(there is no indication he even sought it), he was given standing as a taxpayer to
challenge indirect government support for such conduct through tax exemptions. Id. at
452.
120. 338 F. Supp. at 456. I.R.C. § 170 requires the government to decide whether the
organization has complied with its regulations, which requires the government to ap-
prove or reject the organization's application for exemption.
121. 338 F. Supp. at 458. "No income of the sort usually taxed has been generated;
the money has simply been shifted from one pocket to another, both within the same pair
of pants." Id.
122. 44 U.S.L.W. 2481 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976).
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remedy. This theory may thus allow private universities to participate
in a variety of federal programs free from Title IX sanction, where the
programs do not amount to governmental "assistance" to a particular
discriminatory activity.
Selective participation in federal programs may also be an attractive
option for private colleges and universities to the extent that Title IX
remedies are directed only towards the specific programs that fail to
comply with the statute. While the regulations require compliance by
every program and department within a university receiving federal
benefits, 123 the Title IX enforcement provisions state that a finding of
discrimination will result in a cut-off of funds limited "to the particular
program, or part thereof, in which noncompliance has been so found
.... ,"124 Although HEW might prefer to require broad compliance,125
courts have been cognizant of the narrow remedies afforded by the
statute.
In a case arising under Title VI, Board of Public Instruction v.
Finch,126 HEW cut off all federal funds to the school district for failure
to successfully integrate its schools. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
Secretary's decision, finding that two of the programs involved were
integrated and had no connection with the discrimination existing in
the district's other schools. HEW was required to make findings of
discrimination specific to individual programs and terminate only that
assistance associated with the discriminating program. 27
123. Federal benefits now reach even the most obscure university function. HEW
regulations (45 C.F.R. § 100a.10 (1973)) list 33 separate programs providing funds for
such various activities as bilingual education, educational broadcasting, facilities for the
hanicapped, ethnic heritage studies and drug abuse programs. Participation by a univer-
sity in any one of these program requires compliance with Title IX.
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. 11 1972).
125. HEW suggests that discrimination in any university program may cause federal-
ly assisted programs to become infected by a discriminatory environment, therebyjustifying termination of funds. HEW's treatment of athletic programs is a notable (and
controversial) example of this principle. The federal government does not assist any
college varsity athletic programs. College coaches, therefore, have been particularly
upset over the application of Title IX regulations to athletics. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41
(1975).See 121 CONG. REC. S11,055 (daily ed. June 19, 1975) (statement of the Head
Football Coaches). HEW, however, insists that athletic programs fall within Title IX's
jurisdiction. "These sections apply to each segment of the athletic program of a federally
assisted educational institution whether or not that segment is the subject of direct
financial support through the Department." 40 Fed. Reg. 52,655 (1975). E.g., Brenden
v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding Title IX requires that
females be allowed to participate on cross country ski team). See Note, Sex Discrimina-
tion and Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 IowA L. REv. 420, 458-84 (1975).
126. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969); accord, Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542,556-57
(D. Md. 1976).
127. 414 F.2d at 1076-78. For a discussion of Title VI administrative enforcement see
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On the basis of Finch, universities may be encouraged to forego
federal assistance for particular programs in which they prefer not to
submit to regulation, but still accept assistance for other programs.
Finch added a word of caution to its holding, however, stating that an
agency may cut off aid to a non-discriminating program if it "is so
affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system
that it thereby becomes discriminatory."' 28 This theme was further
developed in Bob Jones University v. Johnson.12 9 The university's
racially discriminatory admissions policy was held so directly con-
nected with the payment of student veteran's benefits that such funds
were ordered terminated resulting in a loss to the school of $397,800.
The court reasoned that Title VI applied to any federal funding which
would defray the costs of the educational program (thereby releasing
institutional funds for other purposes) or would allow the participation
of students who would not otherwise enter the educational
programs. 130
In some cases very remote connections between discrimination and
federal aid will be said to require termination. 131 Rigorous adherence to
the Bob Jones rationale could dilute the "state action" protection
afforded private universities. The enforcing agency will nonetheless be
required to make findings of discrimination specific to a particular
program and to limit the effect of termination to the noncomplying
activity. 132 Furthermore, the reasoning of McGlotten indicates that
state action analysis should continue to insulate private universities
against government regulation. 133
Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights in Public Education: Title VI,
HEW, and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 931 (1975). In
Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542, 556-59 (D. Md. 1976), HEW began administrative
proceedings against Maryland's state university system seeking to bar the system's
receipt of $65 million. The court held that HEW must make its charges of discrimination
specific to a program within an institution rather than to a school or the state system of
higher education generally. Furthermore, HEW must make specific charges prior to
initiating enforcement proceedings. To do otherwise, the court reasoned, would compel
a preparation of a defense for each program irrespective of an allegation of discrimina-
tion relating to the program.
128. 414 F.2d at 1079. This is the language HEW relies upon in its interpretation of
the case. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975).
129. 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
130. Id. at 600-03.
131. Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976);
Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 514 (4th
Cir. 1975).
132. See note 125 supra.
133. Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1974); Green v. Connally,
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C. The Religious Exemption Clause
The free establishment of religion clause in the first amendment is a
third constitutional guarantee that serves to inhibit civil interference
with the function and operation of private colleges and universities.
134
Educators associated with some private colleges have suggested that
the abortion, pregnancy, dress, and morality codes prohibited by Title
IX are associated with the religious nature of their institutions and
should therefore be free from regulation. 135 Although Title IX provides
an exemption where its standards "would not be consistent with the
religious tenets of such organizations,"'1 36 the regulations require that
to obtain an exemption a statement must be sent to HEW "identifying
the provisions of [Title IX] which conflict with a specific tenent of the
religious organization.' ' 37 Schools complain that through this section
''a government agency reserves the right to judge the content and
application of a religious tenet, and presumably to deny an institution's
assertion that its religious belief compels a certain action or
teaching."1 38
330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164-65 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971);
McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498,502 (D.N.M. 1970); Green v. Kennedy,
309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom. Coit v. Green, 400
U.S. 986 (1971).
134. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Thomas Jefferson saw the
amendment as making explicit "a wall of separation between church and state." L.
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 119 (1953). See also W. GELLHORN & R.
GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 131-66; Note, Private Colleges, State Aid, and the
Establishment Clause, 1975 DUKE L.J. 976.
135. Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 4, at 250, 255 (state-
ment of American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Universities).
The Missouri Baptist Convention was motivated to pass a motion prohibiting the four
Missouri Baptist colleges from participating in any program of public aid that requires
nondiscriminatory acceptance of students, hiring of faculty regardless of their religious
affiliation, or the isolation of religion from the rest of the college program. Adams,
Baptist Group to Challenge Tuition Action, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 21, 1976, at 21,
col. 1.
Title IX has also been disruptive in a number of other contexts relating to traditional
sex roles. The most notorious case dealt with HEW prohibition of father-son school
banquets. President Ford personally reversed the regulation, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1976,
at 15, col. 8, and Congress subsequently enacted an express exception to Title IX
permitting such events. Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat.
2234 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (8) (Supp. 11 1972).
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (3) (Supp. 11 1972).
137. 45 C.F.R. § 86.12(b) (1975). It has been feared this "grants to the Director the
right to decide whether the religious levels of a faith justify any exception to the
regulations, and there is no guarantee that the university's decision will meet the
Director's criteria." Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 4, at 255.
138. Hearings on Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 4, at 231.
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It is doubtful, however, that the Title IX exemption could be per-
missibly fashioned in a more liberal form. Shortly before the Title IX
exemption was adopted, Congress attempted to broaden the religious
activities exemption in Title VII to keep religious institutions from
being required to accept atheist instructors. The exemption was ex-
panded to employment practices connected with any aspect of the
religious institution's activities irrespective of a particular activity's
connection with religion. 139 In King's Garden v. FCC,140 this change
was held to be overly broad since it favored religious groups over
secular groups and thereby violated both the establishment clause and
the equal protection guarantee. 41 The earlier exemption had been
limited to employment actually connected with the group's religious
activities 142 and as a result had been sustained by the courts. 143 The
Title IX exemption, however, will probably be found permissible.
While the scope of religious "tenets" is broader than "activities," the
fact that Title IX uses bona fide religious justifications for its exemp-
tion should preclude any finding that it is overly expansive.
The Title IX exemption also raises the issue of excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion. In cases dealing with government
involvement in the financing of sectarian colleges, the Supreme Court
has held that governmental associations with religious colleges are
permissible only if such ties serve a secular purpose, have a primary
effect distinct from the advancement of religion and do not excessively
139. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261 § 3, 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-I (1970)). See 118 CONG. REC. 1977-93 (1972); BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Acr OF 1972 332-33 (1973).
140. 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
141. Id. at 57. Defendant was an Evangelical Christian organization operating a radio
station. In order to obtain even a non-religious job with the station, applicants were
required to affirm that they were Christian. An applicant alleged discrimination and the
FCC ordered the station to institute non-discriminatory hiring practices. The court
concluded that to apply Title VII differently among business competitors on the basis of
religion constituted a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. Cases construing
similar state statutes have arrived at a seemingly contrary result by applying such
exemptions broadly. See, e.g., Fair Employment Practices Comm'n v. Tenerovitz, 25
Ill. App. 3d 471, 323 N.E.2d 353 (1975) (religious hospital exempt irrespective of the
non-religious nature of its activity); Cowen v. Lily Dale Assembly, 44 App. Div. 2d 772,
354 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (religious society exempt even in respect to the rental
of recreational facilities to the public).
142. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII § 702 (July
2, 1964): "This title shall not apply to ... a religious corporation, association or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such. . . society of its religious activities."
143. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
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entangle the government in sectarian affairs. 144 Roemer v. Board of
Public Works' 45 involved a state administrative agency that was au-
thorized to determine which portions of a college's program were
secular and which were sectarian. The standard established in Roemer
requires that "the secular and sectarian activities of the colleges [be]
easily separated." 146 As applied in that case, the content of most
classes and activities such as athletic events were presumed to be
secular so that the administrative officials were not required to monitor
particular classes or programs for religious content. 47 Further, in
Kings Garden the court held that the religious exemption should ex-
tend principally to "those who will advocate, defend or explain the
group's beliefs or way of life, either to its own members or to the world
at large."' It therefore appears that HEW would have to honor a
request for an exemption unless the secular and sectarian aspects of
the activity clearly could be separted.' 49
While many private colleges and universities may not be satisfied
even with this amount of leeway, the application to the Title IX
exemption still provides substantial protection for religious institu-
tions. Universities are restricted in the degree to which they may be
sectarian without qualification and still accept public funds,'150 but that
proscription is based upon the constitutional mandate of separation of
144. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679
(1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
145. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
146. Id. at 764
147. Id. at 762. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684-89 (1971), noted that colleges,
compared to secondary schools, are characteristically more secular since college stu-
dents are less susceptible to religious indoctrination, therefore minimizing the problem
of government encouragement of, and entanglement with, religion.
148. 498 F.2d at 56.
149. In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 10 E.P.D. 10,289 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
rev'd in part, 535 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1976), the court construed the exemption in a
fashion similar to Kings Garden to exempt a religious publishing firm from Title VII only
in regard to discrimination with respect to actual membership in the church. In Pacific
Press the central authority of the church had passed a resolution specifically condemning
member employees as "at variance with the church" because they had filed sex discrimi-
nation complaints with the EEOC. To determine the validity of the religious grounds for
exemption, EEOC and the court ignored the resolution and relied instead upon the
official church manual and a general assertion that no "doctrine, tenet or teaching" was
inconsistent with equal employment for women. The court did hold that the church need
not assign the employees editorial duties. See also Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center,
364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho), aff'd, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975) (the court held that Title
VII did not apply to religious discrimination in any context, without any reference to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970)).
150. W. GELLHORN & R. GREENAWALT, supra note 23, at 13-15.
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church and state and not from Title IX.15 1
CONCLUSION
Courts have reached varying results in numerous discrimination
cases presenting similar facts. 152 An attempt to draw a consistent
theory from a particular line of lower court cases necessarily requires
qualification and exception. The cases analyzed in this Note, however,
indicate some general principles that may be useful in reconciling the
interests mandated by Title IX with the preservation of academic
freedom.
One general proposition is that colleges and universities, particularly
private universities, should be allowed discretion in setting their own
terms of professional employment. Arguably, the unwillingness of the
Pace College court to interfere in tenure decisions absent a showing of
specific discrimination coupled with a broad reading of the speech-
conduct dichotomy of McCrary to include hiring decisons as part of
protected speech supports such a proposition. The Cramer court held
that government-imposed faculty selection criteria must be related to
professional qualifications. A second general proposition is that courts
should look beyond the literal terms of Title IX and instead examine
the effect of terminating federal assistance on a university.
In applying these general propositions to the Title IX regulations, an
agency finding of discrimination could not rest merely upon a statisti-
cally verified hardship to women. An actual showing of subjective bias
would have to be established. 153 Furthermore, any remedy imposed
would have to be limited to a specific administrative unit within the
university. Finally, regulations could not be applied to the morality and
151. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
152. Compare DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), with
Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976). Compare
Stewart v. New York Univ., 44 U.S.L.W. 2481 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976), with Cramer
v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976) (reverse discrimina-
tion). Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 529
F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975), with McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M.
1970) (Title VI fund terminations). Compare Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010
(N.D. Cal. 1975), with Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975) (state
action element of § 1985). Compare Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.
1971), with Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45 (E.D. Mo. 1970)
(state charter of university constitutes state action). Compare Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), with Brenden v. Independent School Dist.,
477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (Title IX provides a remedy in a suit by an individual).
153. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
1150, 1166 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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conduct of faculty members whose "secular and sectarian activities
. . .are easily separated"' 54 or who "advocate, defend or explain"
religious or moral beliefs.155
The implementation of Title IX regulations will deprive private col-
leges and universities of some degree of diversity and flexibility. But
constitutional recognition of the value of diversity and autonomy has
not been totally discarded. In McCrary four justices specifically ex-
pressed the view that the legislation in question should not be extended
to private schools. 56 In a case where the activity challenged is less
offensive that that in McCrary, a majority of the Court might restrict
congressional intrusion into private education. Perhaps at that point
the existence of a constitutional basis for the protection of diversity in
private education will be specifically established.
154. 426 U.S. at 764.
155. 498 F.2d at 56.
156. 427 U.S. at 192 (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); id. at 186 (Powell, J.,
separate opinion); id. at 189 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
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